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[Crim. No. 5579. In Bank. June 25, 1954.] 
v. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 
Appellant. 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-While under 
Pen. Code, § 1237, as amended in 1951, an order granting pro-
bation is designated a "final for pur-
pose of appeal, a subsequent order revoking probation does not 
thereby become an "orde1· made after judgment, affecting the 
substantial of the party" and so appealable. 
[2] !d.-Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-Au order pro-
bation made entry of judg·ment is appealable within ex-
Pen. § subd. 3. 
[3] of Appeal.-A notice of will be 
construed to a on merits and avoid 
dismissal because of some technical defect or irregularity. 
rule 31.) 
[4] !d.-Appeal-Notice of Appeal.-Where revocation of proba-
tion and of one aet 
See and Error, § 86. 
McK. Dig. References: 2] Criminal Law, § 1053(5); [3, 4] 
Criminal Law, § Criminal § 998. 
144 PEOPLE v. 1\0BINSO:'-< C.2d 
and defendant, in taking his appeal from such adjudication, 
improperly designates objectionable ruling as "order revoking 
probation" rather than judgment of which order was an 
intt>gral part, and where attempted appPal was taken 
and respondent suffered no prejudice by reason of improper 
de~ignation, notice of appeal should be construed as sufficient 
to eonstitute an appeal from the "judg·mcnt," as authorized 
and intended, and merits of appeal will be considered in in-
terest of justice. 
[5) Id.-Probation--Review.-.Judgment pronounced against de-
ff'ndant on revocation of his probation will not be disturbed 
on appeal where, at time of such revocation, a hearing was 
had wherein it appeared that defendant had been found guilty 
of conspiracy to violate bookmaking statute (Pen. Code, 
~ 337a), and that judgment of convietion, though not then 
final pending appeal, was sufficient to warrant trial court's 
conclusion that defPndant was engaged in criminal practices 
in violation of terms of his probation. 
APPEAIJ from a judgment of the Superior Court of IJos 
Angeles County. F'red Miller, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Conviction of bookmaking. 
revoking probation construed 
ment. 
Notice of appeal from order 
as noti(:e of appeal from judg-
Andrew H. McConnell, Samuelson & Buck and Clarence 
Hengel for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and ·william E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Hesponclent. 
SPENCE, J.-In September, 1951, defeudant pleaded guilty 
to a charge of violating Penal Code, section 337 a, subdivision 
~l (bookmaking), and applied for probation. On November 5, 
] 9GJ, upon arraignment for judgment, procee<lings \\·ere sus-
pended and defendant was placed on ''probation for a period 
of two years under the following conditions: Defendant must 
serve thirty tlays of his probationary period in the County 
.JaiL with good time a llmvec1, if earned; must not engage in 
gambling activities; and must obey all rules and regulations 
of the Probation Department.'' On Ma~· 7, 1953. the court 
found that drfendant had violatetl the terms of his probation, 
which was I hereupon revoked. and jnc!gment \Yas pronotmced, 
whereby defendant was sentenced to the eouuty jail for the 
term of three months. Defendant appeals from the "order 
revokillg probation.'' 
June 1954 J PEOPLE v. RoBINSON 
[43 C.2d 143; 271 P.2d 872] 
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Preliminarily, the propriety of defendant's designation of 
his appeal as an appeal from the "order" rather than the 
"judgment" must be considered. At the time probation 
was granted in November, 1951, as well as later when it was 
revoked and sentence was pronounced, Penal Code, section 
1237, as amended in 1951, authorized an appeal by a de-
fendant : '' 1. Prom a final judgment of convictiou; an order 
gmnting probation shall be deemed to be a final .iuclgrnent 
within the meam:ng of this sect·ion; 2 .... 3. Prom any order 
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the 
party." (Emphasis added.) Prior to the 1951 amendment 
adding the italicized clause, an order granting probation did 
not constitute a "final judgment of conviction" from which 
an appeal might be taken. (In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55, 
63-64 [109 P.2d 344, 132 A.L.R. 644]; People v. Leach, 90 
Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [203 P.2d 544].) [1] While under 
the 1951 amendment an order g-ranting probation is expressly 
designated a "final judgment" for the purpose of appeal 
(People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 254 [260 P.2d 8] ; People 
v. Brown, 114 Cal.App.2c1 52, 53 [249 P .2d 595] ; People v. 
Smnner, 117 Cal.App.2d 40 [254 P.2d 598) ), a subsequent 
order revoking probation does not thereby become an "order 
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the 
party" and so appealable. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. 3.) To 
hold otherwise would give the 1951 amendment greater scope 
than its language would reasonably support in its limited 
extension of a defendant's right to appeal from a theretofore 
nonappealable order. (3 Cal.Jur.2d, § 86, p. 536.) Rather, 
it would appear that upon entry of judgment in a case 
following the order revoking probation, the latter order does 
not gain any added stature by reason of the 1951 amendment 
because made after the order granting probation but it re-
mains, as before, an intermediate order reviewable on appeal 
from the judgment. (People v. Boyce, 99 Cal.App.2d 439, 
442 [221 P.2d 1011].) [2] Of course, an order revoking 
probation made after entry of judgment is appealable within 
the express terms of subdivision 3, section 1237, of the Penal 
Code. (People v. Martin, 58 Cal.App.2d 677, 678 [137 P.2d 
468].) 
[3] However, a notice of appeal will be liberally construed 
to permit a hearing on the merits and avoid a dismissal be-
eause of some technical defect or irregularity. (People v. 
Guerrero, 22 Cal.2d 183, 185 [137 P.2d 21]; Rules on Appeal, 
rule 31, 36 Cal.2d 26.) [4] Here the judgment, after pre-
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order was an rntt>O'le<l 
the attempted taken 
same day that the was pronounced) and respondent 
has suffered no reason of the improper 
tion, the notice of appeal should be construed as sufficient 
to constitute an appeal from the ''judgment,'' as authorized 
and intended. The notice was so considered the trial judge, 
who ordered the clerk's and reporter's prepared 
and they are in the record before us. Accordingly, in the 
interest of justice, the merits of defendant's appeal will be 
reviewed. (People v. Hawthorne, 63 Cal.App.2d 262, 264 
[146 P.2d 517]; People v. Aresen, 91 Cal.App.2d 26, 28 
[204 P.2d 389, 957] ; see also Collins v. City & County 
San Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 722-723 [247 P.2d 362] .) 
[5] The record reveals that at the time of revocation of 
defendant's probation, a hearing was had wherein it appeared 
that defendant had been found guilty of a conspiracy to 
violate section 337 a of the Penal Code (committed October 
24, 1952). The appeal from such judgment of conviction has 
this day been decided and the judgment has been affirmed. 
(People v. Robinson, Crim. No. 5580, ante, p. 132 [271 P.2d 
865].) Manifestly, such conviction, though not then final 
pending appeal, was sufficient to warrant the trial court's 
conclusion that defendant was engaged in criminal practices 
in violation of the terms of his probation, which was there-
upon revoked. Under all the circumstances there is no 
basis for disturbing the judgment entered against defendant. 
(People v. Hainline, 219 Cal. 532, 534 [28 P.2d 16] ; People 
v. S,ilverman, 33 Cal.App,2d 1, 5 [92 P.2d 507].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, Acting C. J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, ,J., and Bray, 
,J. pro tern.,* concurred. 
CAUTER, J.-I dissent. 
Assuming that defendant bas a valid appeal from the order 
revoking probation, I would reverse the order as I do not 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
BRADNER v. VASQUEZ 
[43 C.2d 147; 272 P.2d lll 
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a valid order probation can be predicated 
upon a of convic:tion which has not become final. 
If such a procedure is permitt(•(l. a defendant who has been 
admitted to probation could have his probation revoked upon 
the of a judgment nst him in another criminal 
even though tlw latter be void 
to collateral attack It may be true that the 
eourt could have based its order probation upon 
the evidence at the trial in which the judgment 
of conviction was obtained, but that is quite a different matter 
than the order revoking probation upon the judgment 
of cmwiction which has not become finaL For the foregoing 
reason I would reverse the order revoking probation and 
the which was pronounced against defendant fol-
of the order revoking probation. 
J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22715. In Bank. ,June 29, 1954.] 
ANN SMITH BHADNER as Executrix. Appellant, v. 
I,EANDHO ,T. V ASQlJBZ ct aL H.espondents. 
[1] Attorneys-Dealing With Client-Presumption of Invalidity.-
Civ. Code, § 2235, deelaring that transactions between trustee 
and beneficiary by which trustee obtains advantage from bene-
ficiary are presumed to be without consideration and under 
undue influence, applies to contractual dealings between at-
torney and client because such relationship is one of a strict 
fiduciary and confidential nature. 
[2] Trusts-Transactions Between Persons in Trust Relations-
Presumptions.-To bring into operation presumptions of in-
sufficient consideration and of undue influence created by Civ. 
Code, § 2235, with respect to transactions between trustee and 
beneficiary, it is necessary to show that a confidential rela-
tionship existed and that this relationship was used by fiduciary 
to gain an advantage, but such advantage need not be an un-
fair one. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 137, 142 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 48 et seq. 
[2) See Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 5; Am.Jur., Trusts, § 605. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 35; [2] Trusts, § 16; 
[3, 4] Attorneys, § 39. 
